Foucault on Parrhesia

23 June

- French philosopher Michel Foucault’s lectures at Berkeley in 1983 from his seminar entitled Discourse and Truth explore the Ancient Greek concept of “parrhesia” (“free speech” or “truth-telling”).

- The link to the text can be found here: https://foucault.info/parrhesia/

- The text was compiled from tape-recordings made of six lectures delivered, in English, by Michel Foucault at the University of California at Berkeley between October 10 and November 30, 1983. The lectures were given as part of Foucault’s seminar, entitled Discourse and Truth. Since Foucault did not write, correct, or edit any part of the text which follows, it lacks his imprimatur and does not present his own lecture notes. What is given here constitutes only the notes of one of his auditors. Although the present text is primarily a verbatim transcription of the lectures, repetitive sentences or phrases have been eliminated, responses to questions have been incorporated, whenever possible, into the lectures themselves, and numerous sentences have been revised, the division of the lectures into sections and the section headings also have been added, all in the hope of producing a more readable set of notes.

- Below are some of the key quotes and learnings from Foucault’s 1983 lectures on parrhesia, followed at the end by a summary of some of the related work by German philosopher Jurgen Habermas.

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Definitions

- Parrhesia is a Greek term (παρρησία) that means “free speech” or “frank speech”. In ancient Greece, it referred to the right to speak one's mind freely, without fear of retribution or censorship. Parrhesia was considered a fundamental aspect of democratic citizenship and a key component of Athenian democracy.

- In philosophical contexts, parrhesia took on a more nuanced meaning. Philosophers like Plato and Aristotle used the term to describe the ability to speak truth to power, to criticize authority, and to engage in open and honest dialogue. Parrhesia was seen as a vital component of philosophical inquiry and critical thinking.

- In modern times, the concept of parrhesia has been revived in various contexts, including:

1. Philosophy: Parrhesia is used to describe the ability to speak truth to power, to challenge dominant ideologies, and to engage in critical thinking.

2. Politics: Parrhesia is used to describe the right to free speech, political dissent, and the ability to hold those in power accountable.

3. Psychology: Parrhesia is used to describe the ability to express oneself authentically, without fear of judgment or rejection.

- Parrhesia could also connote excessive or inappropriate speech in Ancient Greece, like loquaciousness or babbling. The term could imply a lack of self-control or discretion in one's words, leading to unnecessary or unwise speech. In this sense, parrhesia was not always a positive trait, as it could lead to idle chatter, gossip, or even slander. The concept of parrhesia was complex, encompassing both the positive aspects of free speech and the negative aspects of unbridled or thoughtless talk. The philosopher Michel Foucault explored parrhesia in his work, highlighting its dual nature: on one hand, the courageous and truthful speech, and on the other hand, the excessive and potentially harmful speech.

Parrhesia and Frankness

- Etymologically, “parrhesiazesthai” means “to say everything - from “pan” (everything) and “rhema” (that which is said). The one who uses parrhesia, the parrhesiastes, is someone who says everything he has in mind: he does not hide anything, but opens his heart and mind completely to other people through his discourse. In parrhesia, the speaker is supposed to give a complete and exact account of what he has in mind so that the audience is able to comprehend exactly what the speaker thinks.

- The word “parrhesia” then, refers to a type of relationship between the speaker and what he says. For in parrhesia, the speaker makes it manifestly clear and obvious that what he says is his own opinion. And he does this by avoiding any kind of rhetorical form which would veil what he thinks. Instead, the parrhesiastes uses the most direct words and forms of expression he can ﬁnd. Whereas rhetoric provides the speaker with technical devices to help him prevail upon the minds of his audience (regardless of the rhetorician’s own opinion concerning what he says), in parrhesia, the parrhesiastes acts on other people’s mind by showing them as directly as possible what he actually believes.

- If we distinguish between the speaking subject (the subject of the enunciation) and the grammatical subject of the enounced, we could say that there is also the subject of the enunciandum - which refers to the held belief or opinion of the speaker. In parrhesia the speaker emphasizes the fact that he is both the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciandum - that he himself is the subject of the opinion to which he refers. The speciﬁc “speech activity” of the parrhesiastic enunciation thus takes the form: “I am the one who thinks this and that”.

Parrhesia and Truth

- There are two types of parrhesia which we must distinguish. First, there is a pejorative sense of the word not very far from “chattering” and which consists in saying any or everything one has in mind without qualiﬁcation. This pejorative sense occurs in Plato, for example, as a characterization of the bad democratic constitution where everyone has the right to address himself to his fellow citizens and to tell them anything - even the most stupid or dangerous things for the city. This pejorative meaning is also found more frequently in Christian literature where such “bad” parrhesia is opposed to silence as a discipline or as the requisite condition for the contemplation of God. As a verbal activity which reﬂects every movement of the heart and mind, parrhesia in this negative sense is obviously an obstacle to the contemplation of God.

- Most of the time, however, parrhesia does not have this pejorative meaning in the classical texts, but rather a positive one. “parrhesiazesthai” means “to tell the truth”. But does the parrhesiastes say what he thinks is true, or does he say what is really true? To my mind, the parrhesiastes says what is true because he knows that it is true; and he knows that it is true because it is really true. The parrhesiastes is not only sincere and says what is his opinion, but his opinion is also the truth. He says what he knows to be true. The second characteristic of parrhesia, then, is that there is always an exact coincidence between belief and truth.

- It would be interesting to compare Greek parrhesia with the modern (Cartesian) conception of evidence. For since Descartes, the coincidence between belief and truth is obtained in a certain (mental) evidential experience. For the Greeks, however, the coincidence between belief and truth does not take place in a (mental) experience, but in a verbal activity, namely, parrhesia. It appears that parrhesia, in his Greek sense, can no longer occur in our modern epistemological framework.

- I should note that I never found any texts in ancient Greek culture where the parrhesiastes seems to have any doubts about his own possession of the truth. And indeed, that is the difference between the Cartesian problem and the Parrhesiastic attitude. For before Descartes obtains indubitable clear and distinct evidence, he is not certain that what he believes is, in fact, true. In the Greek conception of parrhesia, however, there does not seem to be a problem about the acquisition of the truth since such truth-having is guaranteed by the possession of certain moral qualities: when someone has certain moral qualities, then that is the proof that he has access to truth - and vice-versa. The “parrhesiastic game” presupposes that the parrhesiastes is someone who has the moral qualities which are required, ﬁrst, to know the truth, and secondly, to convey such truth to others.

- If there is a kind of “proof” of the sincerity of the parrhesiastes, it is his courage. The fact that a speaker says something dangerous - different from what the majority believes - is a strong indication that he is a parrhesiastes. If we raise the question of how we can know whether someone is a truth-teller, we raise two questions. First, how is it that we can know whether some particular individual is a truth-teller; and secondly, how is it that the alleged parrhesiastes can be certain that what he believes is, in fact, truth. The ﬁrst question - recognizing someone as a parrhesiastes - was a very important one in Greco-Roman society, and, as we shall see, was explicitly raised and discussed by Plutarch, Galen, and others. The second skeptical question, however, is a particularly modern one which, I believe, is foreign to the Greeks.

Parrhesia and Danger

- Someone is said to use parrhesia and merits consideration as a parrhesiastes only if there is a risk or danger for him or her in telling the truth. For instance, from the ancient Greek perspective, a grammar teacher may tell the truth to the children that he teaches, and indeed may have no doubt that what he teaches is true. But in spite of this coincidence between belief and truth, he is not a parrhesiastes. However, when a philosopher addresses himself to a sovereign, to a tyrant, and tells him that his tyranny is disturbing and unpleasant because tyranny is incompatible with justice, then the philosopher speaks the truth, believes he is speaking the truth, and, more than that, also takes a risk (since the tyrant may become angry, may punish him, may exile him, may kill him). And that was exactly Plato’s situation with Dionysius in Syracuse - concerning which there are very interesting references in Plato’s Seventh Letter, and also in The Life of Dion by Plutarch.

- So you see, the parrhesiastes is someone who takes a risk. Of course, this risk is not always a risk of life. When, for example, you see a friend doing something wrong and you risk incurring his anger by telling him he is wrong, you are acting as a parrhesiastes. In such a case, you do not risk your life, but you may hurt him by your remarks, and your friendship may consequently suffer for it. If, in a political debate, an orator risks losing his popularity because his opinions are contrary to the majority’s opinion, or his opinions may usher in a political scandal, he uses parrhesia. Parrhesia, then, is linked to courage in the face of danger: it demands the courage to speak the truth in spite of some danger. And in its extreme form, telling the truth takes place in the “game” of life or death.

- It is because the parrhesiastes must take a risk in speaking the truth that the king or tyrant generally cannot use parrhesia; for he risks nothing.

- When you accept the parrhesiastic game in which your own life is exposed, you are taking up a speciﬁc relationship to yourself: you risk death to tell the truth instead of reposing in the security of a life where the truth goes unspoken. Of course, the threat of death comes from the Other, and thereby requires a relationship to himself: he prefers himself as a truth-teller rather than as a living being who is false to himself.

Parrhesia and Criticism

- If, during a trial, you say something which can be used against you, you may not be using parrhesia in spite of the fact that you are sincere, that you believe what you say is true, and you are endangering yourself in so speaking. For in parrhesia the danger always comes from the fact that the said truth is capable of hurting or angering the interlocutor. Parrhesia is thus always a “game” between the one who speaks the truth and the interlocutor. The parrhesia involved, for example, may be the advice that the interlocutor should behave in a certain way, or that he is wrong in what he thinks, or in the way he acts, and so on. Or the parrhesia may be a confession to someone who exercises power over him, and is able to censure or punish him for what he has done.

- So you see, the function of parrhesia is not to demonstrate the truth to someone else, but has the function of criticism: criticism of the interlocutor or of the speaker himself. “This is what you do and this is what you think; but this is what you should not do and should not think.” “This is the way you behave, but that is the way you ought to behave.” “This is what I have done, and was wrong in so doing.” Parrhesia is a form of criticism, either towards another or towards oneself, but always in a situation where the speaker or confessor is in a position of inferiority with respect to the interlocutor. The parrhesiastes is always less powerful than the one with whom he or she speaks. The parrhesia comes from “below”, as it were, and is directed towards “above”. This is why an ancient Greek would not say that a teacher or father who criticizes a child uses parrhesia. But when a philosopher criticizes a tyrant, when a citizen criticizes the majority, when a pupil criticizes his or her teacher, then such speakers may be using parrhesia.

- This is not to imply, however, that anyone can use parrhesia. For although there is a text in Euripides where a servant uses parrhesia, most of the time the use of parrhesia requires that the parrhesiastes know his own genealogy, his own status; i.e., usually one must ﬁrst be a male citizen to speak the truth as a parrhesiastes. Indeed, someone who is deprived of parrhesia is in the same situation as a slave to the extent that he or she cannot take part in the political life of the city, nor play the “parrhesiastic game”. In “democratic parrhesia” - where one speaks to the assembly, the ekklesia - one must be a citizen; in fact, one must be one of the best among the citizens, possessing those speciﬁc personal, moral, and social qualities which grant one the privilege to speak.

- However, the parrhesiastes risks his privilege to speak freely when he discloses a truth which threatens the majority. For it was a well-known juridical situation when Athenian leaders were exiled only because they proposed something which was opposed by the majority, or even because the assembly thought that the strong inﬂuence of certain leaders limited its own freedom. And so the assembly was, in this manner, “protected” against the truth. That, then, is the institutional background of “democratic parrhesia” which must be distinguished from that “monarchic parrhesia” where an advisor gives the sovereign honest and helpful advice.

Parrhesia and Duty

- The last characteristic of parrhesia is this: in parrhesia, telling the truth is regarded as a duty. The orator who speaks the truth to those who cannot accept his truth, for instance, and who may be exiled, or punished in some way, is free to keep silent. No one forces him to speak; but he feels that it is his duty to do so. When, on the other hand, someone is compelled to tell the truth (as, for example, under duress of torture), then his discourse is not a parrhesiastic utterance. A criminal who is forced by his judges to confess his crime does not use parrhesia. But if he voluntarily confesses his crime to someone else out of a sense of moral obligation, then he performs a parrhesiastic act to criticize a friend who does not recognize his wrongdoing, or insofar as it is a duty towards the city to help the king to better himself as a sovereign. Parrhesia is thus related to freedom and to duty.

- To summarize the foregoing, parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a speciﬁc relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a speciﬁc relation to moral law through freedom and duty. More precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself). In parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of ﬂattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy.

- That, then, quite generally, is the positive meaning of the word “parrhesia” in most of the Greek texts where it occurs from the Fifth Century BC to the Fifth Century AD.

Parrhesia and Rhetoric

- The ﬁrst concerns the relationship of parrhesia to rhetoric - a relationship which is problematic even in Euripides. In the Socratic-Platonic tradition, parrhesia and rhetoric stand in a strong opposition; and this opposition appears very clearly in the Gorgias, for example, where the word “parrhesia” occurs. The continuous long speech is a rhetorical or sophistical device, whereas the dialogue through questions and answers is typical for parrhesia; i.e., dialogue is a major technique for playing the parrhesiastic game.

- The opposition of parrhesia and rhetoric also runs through the Phaedrus - where, as you know, the main problem is not about the nature of the opposition between speech and writing, but concerns the difference between the logos which speaks the truth and the logos which is not capable of such truth-telling. This opposition between parrhesia and rhetoric, which is so clear-cut in the Fourth Century BC throughout Plato’s writings, will last for centuries in the philosophical tradition. In Seneca, for example, one ﬁnds the idea that personal conversations are the best vehicle for frank speaking and truth-telling insofar as one can dispense, in such conversations, with the need for rhetorical devices and ornamentation. And even during the Second Century AD the cultural opposition between rhetoric and philosophy is still very clear and important.

- However, one can also ﬁnd some signs of the incorporation of parrhesia within the ﬁeld of rhetoric in the work of rhetoricians at the beginning of the Empire. In Quintillian’s Institutio Oratoria, for example (Book IX, Chapter II), Quintillian explains that some rhetorical ﬁgures are speciﬁcally adapted for intensifying the emotions of the audience; and such technical ﬁgures he calls by the name “exclamatio”. Related to these exclamations is a kind of natural exclamation which, Quintillian notes, is not “simulated or artfully designed.” This type of natural exclamation he calls “free speech” [libera oratione] which, he tells us, was called “license” [licentia] by Corniﬁcius, and “parrhesia” by the Greeks. Parrhesia is thus a sort of “ﬁgure” among rhetorical ﬁgures, but with this characteristic: that it is without any ﬁgure since it is completely natural. Parrhesia is the zero degree of those rhetorical ﬁgures which intensify the emotions of the audience.

Parrhesia and Politics

- The second important aspect of the evolution of parrhesia is related to the political ﬁeld. As it appears in Euripides plays and also in the texts of the Fourth Century BC, parrhesia is an essential characteristic of Athenian democracy. Of course, we still have to investigate the role of parrhesia in the Athenian constitution. But we can say quite generally that parrhesia was a guideline for democracy as well as an ethical and personal attitude characteristic of the good citizen. Athenian democracy was deﬁned very explicitly as a constitution (politeia) in which people enjoyed demokratia, isegoria (the equal right of speech), isonomia (the equal participation of all citizens in the exercise of power), and parrhesia. Parrhesia, which is a requisite for public speech, takes place between citizens as individuals, and also between citizens construed as an assembly. Moreover, the agora is the place where parrhesia appears.

- During the Hellenistic period this political meaning changes with the rise of the Hellenic monarchies. Parrhesia now becomes centered in the relationship between the sovereign and his advisors or court men. In the monarchic constitution of the state, it is the advisor’s duty to use parrhesia to help the king with his decisions, and to prevent him from abusing his power. Parrhesia is necessary and useful both for the king and for the people under his rule. The sovereign himself is not a parrhesiastes, but a touchstone of the good ruler is his ability to play the parrhesiastic game. Thus, a good king accepts everything that a genuine parrhesiastes tells him, even if it turns out to be unpleasant for him to hear criticism of his decisions. A sovereign shows himself to be a tyrant if he disregards his honest advisors, or punishes them for what they have said. The portrayal of a sovereign by most Greek historians takes into account the way he behaves towards his advisors - as if such behavior were an index of his ability to hear the parrhesiastes.

- There is also a third category of players in the monarchic parrhesiastic game, viz., the silent majority: the people in general who are not present at the exchanges between the king and his advisors, but to whom, and on behalf of whom, the advisors refer when offering advice to the king.

- The place where parrhesia appears in the context of monarchic rule is the king’s court, and no longer the agora.

Parrhesia and Philosophy

- Finally, parrhesia’s evolution can be traced through its relation to the ﬁeld of philosophy - regarded as an art of life (techne tou biou).

- In the writings of Plato, Socrates appears in the role of the parrhesiastes. Although the word “parrhesia” appears several times in Plato, he never uses the word “parrhesiastes” - a word which only appears later as part of the Greek vocabulary. And yet the role of Socrates is typically a parrhesiastic one, for he constantly confronts Athenians in the street and, as noted in the Apology, points out the truth to them, bidding them to care for wisdom, truth, and the perfection of their souls. And in the Alcibiades Majoras well, Socrates assumes a parrhesiastic role in the dialogue. For whereas Alcibiades friends and lovers all ﬂatter him in their attempt to obtain his favors, Socrates risks provoking Alcibiades anger when he leads him to this idea: that before Alcibiades will be able to accomplish what he is so set on achieving, viz., to become the ﬁrst among the Athenians to rule Athens and become more powerful than the King of Persia, before he will be able to take care of Athens, he must ﬁrst learn to take care of himself. Philosophical parrhesia is thus associated with the theme of the care of oneself (epimeleia heautou).

- By the time of the Epicureans, parrhesia’s afﬁnity with the care of oneself developed to the point where parrhesia itself was primarily regarded as a techne of spiritual guidance for the “education of the soul”. Philodemus [110-140 BC], for example (who, with Lucretius [99-55 BC], was one of the most signiﬁcant Epicurian writers during the First Century BC), wrote a book about parrhesia which concern technical practices useful for teaching and helping one another in the Epicurean community. We shall examine some of these parrhesiastic technique as they developed in, for example, the Stoic philosophies of Epictetus, Seneca, and others.

Parrhesia and the Crisis of Democratic Institutions

- The explicit criticism of speakers who utilized parrhesia in its negative sense became a commonplace in Greek political thought since the Peloponnesian War; and a debate emerged concerning the relationship of parrhesia to democratic institutions. The problem, very roughly put, was the following. Democracy is founded by a politeia, a constitution, where the demos, the people, exercise power, and where everyone is equal in front of the law. Such a constitution, however, is condemned to give equal place to all forms of parrhesia, even the worst. Because parrhesia is given even to the worst citizens, the overwhelming inﬂuence of bad, immoral, or ignorant speakers may lead the citizenry into tyranny, or may otherwise endanger the city. Hence parrhesia may be dangerous for democracy itself. Thus this problem seems coherent and familiar, but for the Greeks the discovery of this problem, of a necessary antinomy between parrhesia - freedom of speech - and democracy, inaugurated a long impassioned debate concerning the precise nature of the dangerous relations which seemed to exist between democracy, logos, freedom, and truth.

- What is interesting about this text is that Plato does not blame parrhesia for endowing everyone with the possibility of inﬂuencing the city, including the worst citizens. For Plato, the primary danger of parrhesia is not that it leads to bad decisions in government, or provides the means for some ignorant or corrupt leader to gain power, to become a tyrant. The primary danger of liberty and free speech in a democracy is what results when everyone has his own manner of life, his own style of life. For then there can be no common logos, no possible unity, for the city. Following the Platonic principle that there is an analogous relation between the way a human being behaves and the way a city is ruled, between the hierarchical organization of the faculties of a human being and the constitutional make-up of the polis, you can see very well that if everyone in the city behaves just as he or she wishes, with each person following his own opinion, his own will or desire, then there are in the city as many constitutions, as many small autonomous cities, as there are citizens doing whatever they please. And you can see that Plato also considers parrhesia not only as the freedom to say whatever one wishes, but as linked with the freedom to do whatever one wants. It is a kind of anarchy involving the freedom to choose one’s own style of life without limit.

- First, as is clear in Plato’s text for example, the problem of the freedom of speech becomes increasingly related to the choice of existence, to the choice of one’s way of life. Freedom in the use of logos increasingly becomes freedom in the choice of bios. And as a result, parrhesia is regarded more and more as a personal attitude, a personal quality, as a virtue which is useful for the city’s political life in the case of positive or critical parrhesia, or as a danger for the city in the case of negative, pejorative parrhesia. In Demosthenes, for example, one can ﬁnd a number of references to parrhesia but parrhesia is usually spoken of as a personal quality, and not as an institutional right. Demosthenes does not seek, or make an issue of institutional guarantees for parrhesia, but insists on the fact that he, as a personal citizen, will use parrhesia because he must boldly speak the truth about the city’s bad politics. And he claims that in so doing, he runs a great risk. For it is dangerous for him to speak freely, given that the Athenians in the Assembly are so reluctant to accept any criticism.

- The word is also used by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics [Book IV, 1124b28], not to characterize a political practice or institution, but as a trait of the magnanimous man, the megalopsychos (“great-souledness”). Some of the other characteristics of the magnanimous man are more or less related to the parrhesiastic character and attitude. For example, the megalopsychos is courageous, but he is not someone who likes danger so much that he runs out to greet it. His courage is rational [1124 b7-9]. He prefers aletheia to doxa, truth to opinion. He does not like ﬂatterers. And since he looks down on other men, he is “outspoken and frank” [1124 b28]. He uses parrhesia to speak the truth because he is able to recognize the faults of others: he is conscious of his own difference from them, of his own superiority. So you see that for Aristotle, parrhesia is either a moral-ethical quality, or pertains to free speech as addressed to a monarch. Increasingly, these personal. and moral features of parrhesia become more pronounced.

Techniques of the Parrhesiastic Games

- For example, it was a commonplace to say that any kind of art or technique had to be learned by mathesis and askesis - by theoretical knowledge and practical training. And, for instance, when Musonius Rufus says that the art of living, techne tou biou, is like the other arts, i.e., an art which one could not learn only through theoretical teachings, he is repeating a traditional doctrine. This techne tou biou, this art of living, demands practice and training: askesis. But the Greek conception of askesis differs from Christian ascetic practices in at least two ways:

(1) Christian asceticism has its ultimate aim or target the renunciation of the self, whereas the moral askesis of the Greco-Roman philosophies has as its goal the establishment of a speciﬁc relationship to oneself - a relationship of self-possession and self-sovereignty;

(2) Christian asceticism takes as its principle theme detachment from the world, whereas the ascetic practices of the Greco-Roman philosophies are generally concerned with endowing the individual with the preparation and the moral equipment that will permit him to fully confront the world in an ethical and rational manner.

Conclusion of Techniques of Parrhesia

- In reading these texts about self-examination and underlining the differences between them, I wanted to show you, ﬁrst, that there is a noticeable shift in the parrhesiastic practices between the “master” and the “disciple”. Previously, when parrhesia appeared in the context of spiritual guidance, the master was the one who disclosed the truth about the disciple. In these exercises, the master still uses frankness of speech with the disciple in order to help him became aware of the faults he cannot see (Seneca uses parrhesia towards Serenus, Epictetus uses parrhesia towards his disciples); but now the use of parrhesia is put increasingly upon the disciple as his own duty towards himself. At this point the truth about the disciple is not disclosed solely through the parrhesiastic discourse of the master, or only in the dialogue between the master and the disciple or interlocutor. The truth about the disciple emerges from a personal relation which he establishes with himself; and this truth can now be disclosed either to himself (as in the ﬁrst example from Seneca) or to someone else (as in the second example from Seneca). And the disciple must also test himself, and check to see whether he is able to achieve self-mastery (as in the examples from Epictetus) .

- Secondly, it is not sufﬁcient to analyze this personal relation of self-understanding as merely deriving from the general principle “gnothi seauton”- “know thyself”. Of course, in a certain general sense it can be derived from this principle, but we cannot stop at this point. For the various relationships which one has to oneself are embedded in very precise techniques which take the form of spiritual exercises - some of them dealing with deeds, others with states of equilibrium of the soul, others with the ﬂow of representations, and so on.

- Third point. In all these different exercises, what is at stake is not the disclosure of a secret which has to excavated from out of the depths of the soul. What is at stake is the relation of the self to truth or to some rational principles. Recall that the question which motivated Seneca’s evening self- examination was: “Did I bring into play those principles of behavior I know very well, but, as it sometimes happens, I do not always conform to or always apply? Another question was: “Am I able to adhere to the principles I am familiar with, I agree with, and which I practice most of the time? “For that was Serenus’ question. Or the question Epictetus raised in the exercises I was just discussing: “Am I able to react to any kind of representation which shows itself to me in conformity with my adopted rational rules? What we have to underline here is this: if the truth of the self in these exercises is nothing other than the relation of the self to truth, then this truth is not purely theoretical. The truth of the self involves, on the one hand, a set of rational principles which are grounded in general statements about the world, human life, necessity, happiness, freedom, and so on, and, on the other hand, practical rules for behavior. And the question which is raised in these different exercises is oriented towards the following problem: Are we familiar enough with these rational principles? Are they sufﬁciently well-established in our minds to become practical rules for our everyday behavior? And the problem of memory is at the heart of these techniques, but in the form of an attempt to remind ourselves of what we have done, thought, or felt so that we may reactivate our rational principles, thus making them as permanent and as effective as possible in our life.

- These exercises are part of what we could call an “aesthetics of the self. “ For one does not have to take up a position or role towards oneself as that of a judge pronouncing a verdict. One can comport oneself towards oneself in the role of a technician, of a craftsman, of an artist, who - from time to time - stops working, examines what he is doing, reminds himself of the rule of his art, and compares these rules with what he has achieved thus far. This metaphor of the artist who stops working, steps back, gains a distant perspective, and examines what he is actually doing with the principles of his art can be found in Plutarch’s essay, “On the Control of Anger“.

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Jurgen Habermas, German philosopher (1929-?)

Parrhesia also relates to the German philosopher Jurgen Habermas' work on communicative rationality and public discourse in the following ways:

- Truth-telling: Parrhesia involves speaking truth to power, aligning with Habermas' emphasis on truthfulness in communicative rationality.

- Critical discourse: Parrhesia encourages critical examination, mirroring Habermas' focus on critical discourse in public spheres.

- Public engagement: Parrhesia promotes public engagement, aligning with Habermas' emphasis on public discourse and deliberation.

- Moral responsibility: Parrhesia implies moral responsibility, echoing Habermas' stress on moral and political responsibility in communicative rationality.

- Non-manipulative communication: Parrhesia rejects manipulation, aligning with Habermas' goal of non-manipulative communication in public discourse.

- Emphasis on reason: Parrhesia relies on reason, mirroring Habermas' emphasis on reason in communicative rationality.

- Focus on the common good: Parrhesia prioritizes the common good, aligning with Habermas' focus on the public interest in public discourse.

Habermas' ethics of subjectivity, developed in his later work, focuses on the moral and political implications of individual autonomy and self-expression. Key aspects include:

1. Self-responsibility: Individuals are responsible for their own lives, values, and beliefs.

2. Autonomy: Individuals should be free to make their own decisions and choices.

3. Reflexivity: Individuals should critically reflect on their own beliefs, values, and actions.

4. Authenticity: Individuals should be true to themselves and their own experiences.

5. Vulnerability: Individuals are vulnerable and finite, and should acknowledge this in their ethical decisions.

- Habermas sees this ethics of subjectivity as essential for:

1. Moral responsibility: Individuals must take responsibility for their actions and decisions.

2. Political engagement: Individuals should engage in public discourse and democratic decision-making.

3. Personal growth: Individuals should strive for self-improvement and self-realization.

- By emphasizing individual autonomy and self-expression, Habermas' ethics of subjectivity complements his earlier work on communicative rationality and the public sphere. It highlights the importance of individual moral and political agency in democratic societies and the relevance of the concept and practice of parrhesia to contemporary democratic discourse.

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Foucault on Parrhesia

Senate Committee Report on the Consulting Industry